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Publications

NIBIOs employees contribute to several hundred scientific articles and research reports every year. You can browse or search in our collection which contains references and links to these publications as well as other research and dissemination activities. The collection is continously updated with new and historical material.

2024

Authors

Emily Follett Jorunn Børve Siv Fagertun Remberg

Abstract

Authors

Theresa Weigl Jorunn Børve Emily Follett Siv Fagertun Remberg

Abstract

No abstract has been registered

To document

Authors

Clara Antón-Fernández

Abstract

No abstract has been registered

Authors

Lampros Lamprinakis

Abstract

No abstract has been registered

Authors

Paal Krokene

Abstract

No abstract has been registered

Authors

Tomáš Hlásny Roman Modlinger Nick Schafstall Iris Bernardinelli Eckehard G. Brockerhoff György Csóka; Maarten de Groot Mihai-Leonard Duduman Massimo Faccoli Jostein Gohli Wojciech Grodzki Anikó Hirka Gernot Hoch Tomasz Jabłoński Marija Kolšek Paal Krokene Andrew Liebhold Markus Melin Slobodan Milanovic Milan Pernek Martin Schroeder Gottfried Steyrer Jozef Vakula Tiina Ylioja

Abstract

No abstract has been registered

Authors

Theresa Weigl Jorunn Børve Emily Follett Melissa Magerøy Carl Gunnar Fossdal Hanne Larsen Siv Fagertun Remberg

Abstract

No abstract has been registered

To document

Authors

Jostein Gohli Paal Krokene Bjørn Økland

Abstract

No abstract has been registered

Authors

Helge Berglann Trond Bjørndal Francesc Maynou

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a fishery control scheme which happens to be first best efficient in the context of a Gordon-Schaefer model where asymmetric information about effort/harvesting costs is present. It is widely acknowledged that in the absence of regulations, competition between vessels leads to a competitive game wherein the outcome is inefficient. We introduce a management scheme that regulates the fishing industry through a convex tax on effort. The shares of this tax can be traded in a market, thus solving problems related to asymmetric information. This can be achieved since heterogeneous fishing firms are individually stimulated to solve the same optimality problem as a social planner would. We apply this model to the Northwest Mediterranean demersal fishery as a case study.

Authors

Gabriela Wagner

Abstract

No abstract has been registered