Publications
NIBIOs employees contribute to several hundred scientific articles and research reports every year. You can browse or search in our collection which contains references and links to these publications as well as other research and dissemination activities. The collection is continously updated with new and historical material.
2018
Conference lecture – Land lease at the extensive and intensive margins
Eirik Romstad, Grete Stokstad
Abstract
The extent of land lease is increasing in many countries, including Norway. This paper develops a von Thünen type model of optimal land plots to lease from a farm’s center. For a single farm setting the optimality principle is that land is leased as long as the expected marginal value of leasing the land is greater than or equal to the expected marginal costs of leasing the land. The single farm model setting captures land lease at the extensive margin, i.e., under absence of competition for leasing land. Land lease at the intensive margin, i.e., when there is competition for leasing farm fields, is more interesting. We distinguish between two cases. In the first case, continued farm operations do not depend on being able to lease more land. Then we show that optimal land lease results when the expected profits for each farm of leasing its least profitable field is equal among farms competing for the same farm field. This also corresponds to an economically efficient allocation of leased land. Our second case at the intensive margin is more complicated. Here, farm survival depends on attracting acreage of leased land to allow for investment in cost saving technology. We show that the resulting allocation of leased land corresponds to the solution of a game involving bidding for land to prevent other farmers from getting land, which in turn leads to farmer exit and therefore increases the future supply of land available at the land lease market. In the first round of the game, winners of the land lease auction pays more for the leased land than they would have done in absence preventive bidding. The model framework is applicable for other settings where locking out competitors are parts of agents’ strategy space. Key words: von Thünen, non-cooperative game theory, auctions with preventive bidding. JEL classification: C72, D44, L13
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Finn-Arne HaugenAbstract
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Geir-Harald StrandAbstract
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Finn-Arne HaugenAbstract
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The amount of rented farmland in Norway has increased steadily since the 1950s. Concerns have been raised questioning whether farmland is treated less well by tenants compared to landowners. This study aims to investigate how farmers perceive their treatment of rented farmland, which factors impact their decisionmaking related to this and if farmers are concerned about farmland elements that are less important for productivity but mainly of interest for cultural heritage or environmental management reasons. Semi-structured interviews with a group of randomly selected farmers were carried out in an area dominated by intensive agriculture. Independent of, for example, amount of rented land or duration of the rental agreement, all farmers agreed that rented land was treated well. A strong competition for farmland in combination with farmers being dependent on renting land was the most important reason. Results from this study may be transferrable to other farming areas, at least where competition for farmland is comparable. We do suggest, however, that any further research on treatment of rented farmland in Norway should take a regional approach, since national statistics may cover significant regional differences.
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Monika Suškevičs Sebastian Eiter Stanislav Martinat Dina Stober Elis Vollmer Cheryl L. de Boer Matthias BucheckerAbstract
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