Publications
NIBIOs employees contribute to several hundred scientific articles and research reports every year. You can browse or search in our collection which contains references and links to these publications as well as other research and dissemination activities. The collection is continously updated with new and historical material.
2019
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
2018
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
Authors
Alexandra Kruse Naja Marot Zlata Dolacek Alduk Karl Benediktsson Michele Bottarelli Paolo Brito Csaba Centeri Sebastian Eiter Bohumil Frantál Marina Frolova Bénédicte Gaillard Viktor Grónás Maunu Häyrynen Veronica Hernández-Jiménez Richard Hewitt Marcel Hunziker Róbert Kabai Isidora Karan Malgorzata Lachowska Stanislav Martinat Georgios Martinopoulos Nieves Mestre Slobodan B. Mickovski David Miller Pia Otte José Rafael Morenes Munoz-Rochas Sina Röhner Michael Roth Olaf Schroth Alessandra Sconamiglio Mateusz Slupinski Sven Stremke Na'ama TeschnerAbstract
The COST RELY Glossary on Renewable Energy and Landscape Quality is the result of the European COST RELY project that focused on investigating the influence of renewable energy production on landscape quality. 31 people participated in developing and revising the definitions and descriptions for the 46 terms included in the glossary. Work was done in the period from 2015 to 2017 in multiple rounds of revision done by the RELY experts. Terms in the glossary are clustered into three groups: first group terms are directly connected to the landscape and its characteristics, the second one touches the planning process and methods, and the last one covers different renewable energy sources and production types. Each entry to the glossary consists of six elements: the term, definition, related terms, keywords, illustration(s) and sources. The terms are based on the expert knowledge of the contributors, scientific literature (monographs and articles), EU regulation, relevant web pages and other useful sources, stated in the Reference section. At the end of the glossary, terms are translated into 28 European languages including Esperanto. The glossary targets the researchers from the field, policy makers, local communities, investors in the sector of renewable energy and NGOs concerned with the matter in order to assure that people from different educational background and profession understand and use the term in the same manner. Beside from internal Action use, the terms shall contribute to existing glossaries on the relevant topics.
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
Abstract
No abstract has been registered
Conference lecture – Land lease at the extensive and intensive margins
Eirik Romstad, Grete Stokstad
Abstract
The extent of land lease is increasing in many countries, including Norway. This paper develops a von Thünen type model of optimal land plots to lease from a farm’s center. For a single farm setting the optimality principle is that land is leased as long as the expected marginal value of leasing the land is greater than or equal to the expected marginal costs of leasing the land. The single farm model setting captures land lease at the extensive margin, i.e., under absence of competition for leasing land. Land lease at the intensive margin, i.e., when there is competition for leasing farm fields, is more interesting. We distinguish between two cases. In the first case, continued farm operations do not depend on being able to lease more land. Then we show that optimal land lease results when the expected profits for each farm of leasing its least profitable field is equal among farms competing for the same farm field. This also corresponds to an economically efficient allocation of leased land. Our second case at the intensive margin is more complicated. Here, farm survival depends on attracting acreage of leased land to allow for investment in cost saving technology. We show that the resulting allocation of leased land corresponds to the solution of a game involving bidding for land to prevent other farmers from getting land, which in turn leads to farmer exit and therefore increases the future supply of land available at the land lease market. In the first round of the game, winners of the land lease auction pays more for the leased land than they would have done in absence preventive bidding. The model framework is applicable for other settings where locking out competitors are parts of agents’ strategy space. Key words: von Thünen, non-cooperative game theory, auctions with preventive bidding. JEL classification: C72, D44, L13