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Publications

NIBIOs employees contribute to several hundred scientific articles and research reports every year. You can browse or search in our collection which contains references and links to these publications as well as other research and dissemination activities. The collection is continously updated with new and historical material.

2018

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Abstract

We present a methodology for distinguishing between three types of animal movement behavior (foraging, resting, and walking) based on high-frequency tracking data. For each animal we quantify an individual movement path. A movement path is a temporal sequence consisting of the steps through space taken by an animal. By selecting a set of appropriate movement parameters, we develop a method to assess movement behavioral states, reflected by changes in the movement parameters. The two fundamental tasks of our study are segmentation and clustering. By segmentation, we mean the partitioning of the trajectory into segments, which are homogeneous in terms of their movement parameters. By clustering, we mean grouping similar segments together according to their estimated movement parameters. The proposed method is evaluated using field observations (done by humans) of movement behavior. We found that on average, our method agreed with the observational data (ground truth) at a level of 80.75% ± 5.9% (SE).

Abstract

The extent of land lease is increasing in many countries, including Norway. This paper develops a von Thünen type model of optimal land plots to lease from a farm’s center. For a single farm setting the optimality principle is that land is leased as long as the expected marginal value of leasing the land is greater than or equal to the expected marginal costs of leasing the land. The single farm model setting captures land lease at the extensive margin, i.e., under absence of competition for leasing land. Land lease at the intensive margin, i.e., when there is competition for leasing farm fields, is more interesting. We distinguish between two cases. In the first case, continued farm operations do not depend on being able to lease more land. Then we show that optimal land lease results when the expected profits for each farm of leasing its least profitable field is equal among farms competing for the same farm field. This also corresponds to an economically efficient allocation of leased land. Our second case at the intensive margin is more complicated. Here, farm survival depends on attracting acreage of leased land to allow for investment in cost saving technology. We show that the resulting allocation of leased land corresponds to the solution of a game involving bidding for land to prevent other farmers from getting land, which in turn leads to farmer exit and therefore increases the future supply of land available at the land lease market. In the first round of the game, winners of the land lease auction pays more for the leased land than they would have done in absence preventive bidding. The model framework is applicable for other settings where locking out competitors are parts of agents’ strategy space. Key words: von Thünen, non-cooperative game theory, auctions with preventive bidding. JEL classification: C72, D44, L13